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Aidas Masiliūnas a,∗, Heinrich H. Nax b,c
a Global Asia Institute, National University of Singapore, 10 Lower Kent Ridge Road, Singapore 119076, Singapore
b Institute of Sociology, University of Zürich, Andreasstrasse 15, 8050 Zürich, Switzerland
c Behavioral Game Theory, ETH Zürich, Clausiusstrasse 37, 8092 Zürich, Switzerland
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 22 June 2019













We use a unified framework to model rent-seeking (Tullock) contests and games of 
strategic complements or substitutes. In each game, we compare an ‘abstract’ frame with 
an ‘economic’ frame. We find more competitive behavior under economic than under 
abstract framing in the contest and in the game of strategic complements, but not in 
the game of strategic substitutes. Variation in the strategic nature of the game interacts 
differently with preferences than with beliefs, allowing us to identify that framing operates 
primarily through beliefs, and diminishes as beliefs are updated. We model beliefs and 
preferences using a static and a dynamic framework and show that average choices and 
adaptation behavior can be explained if both preferences and beliefs are more competitive 
under economic framing. Our results suggest that some of the commonly observed 
competitive behavior in contest and oligopoly experiments could be explained by non-
abstract framing being used in these studies.
 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the 
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
How a decision is framed has been shown to crucially impact behavior in laboratory experiments.1 One view is that 
games should be framed neutrally to ‘let the explicit reward structure be the singular source of valuation’ (Smith 1976, 
p. 278). An alternative is to embed the game in meaningful context, enhancing the understanding and external validity 
but potentially influencing behavior. In economic experiments, it is common to use either abstract or mildly cooperative 
✩ We would like to thank participants at seminars and conferences at University of Barcelona (IMEBESS 2017), UC Irvine (Theory, History and 
Development Series 2017), University of Lund (Department of Economics Seminar Series 2017), Stony Brook University (Workshop on Adaptive Learning 
2017, 28th International Conference on Game Theory), University of Rennes (ASFEE 2017), Vilnius University (6th Annual Lithuanian Conference on Economic 
Research), Tilburg University (TIBER 2017), Vienna University (VfS Jahrestagung) and Kassel University (GfeW Jahrestagung). Amongst them, we would 
especially like to thank John Duffy, Sergiu Hart, Glenn Harrison, Ozan Isler, Erik Wengström and Vaiva Petrikaitė. We also thank our editor, Gary Charness, 
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context, in which one of the actions is described as generating a positive externality.2 An exception to this convention 
are contest and oligopoly experiments that are almost exclusively run using explicit corporate or competitive framing. The 
resulting behavioral regularities in these experiments are also somewhat unusual: while choices in most other experimental 
games (e.g. voluntary contributions games, trust games, dictator games) are typically ‘pro-social’, that is, between Nash 
equilibria and social optima,3 they typically are ‘anti-social’ in contest and oligopoly games.4 Moreover, while choices in the 
other games tend to move toward the Nash equilibrium, oligopolies often drift toward the ‘Walrasian’ perfectly competitive 
equilibrium, in which individual payoffs are even lower than Nash.5 These unusual behavioral patterns in the games of 
competition raise the question to what extent they are caused by framing.
We address the question by comparing the two framing versions in different types of games. The economic framing treat-
ments replicate the framing that is typically used in the corresponding literature: either corporate language from oligopoly 
experiments (participants are asked to act as a ‘manager’ who chooses ‘how many products to sell’) or competitive language 
from contest experiments (buying ‘tokens’ to increase the ‘share of the prize’). The abstract framing treatments do not pro-
vide any interpretation for the game and replace potentially loaded terms with generic game-theoretic language (‘action’, 
‘other participant’).
In each framing condition, we study three games: contest, strategic complements and strategic substitutes, modeled in 
a unified framework of ‘games of competition’ and therefore distinguished only by the degree of strategic complementar-
ity and substitutability. The games were designed to have the same payoffs and locations of Nash equilibrium, collusive 
outcome and competitive equilibrium. In all games, cooperative choices lie below the Nash equilibrium, and competitive 
choices above it, therefore behavior can be evaluated along a single ‘cooperative–competitive’ dimension.6 We compare a 
hypothesis that economic framing leads participants to expect more competitive behavior from their opponents to a hypoth-
esis that framing triggers competitive preferences. Variation in the degree of strategic complementarity and substitutability 
across games allows us to identify the relative importance of these two channels. If framing operates primarily through 
preferences, economic framing should induce more competitive behavior in all games. If framing operates through beliefs, 
economic framing should induce more competitive behavior in strategic complements, but less competitive behavior in 
strategic substitutes, while contest should fall between the other two games.
The second feature of our design is repetition, implemented using a repeated single-shot design (Andreoni and Croson, 
2008) whereby players are randomly re-matched within their matching group each round. Repetition allows us to test 
whether the effect of framing lasts for the entire duration of the game, as it would if it affected preferences,7 or if the 
effect disappears over time as beliefs are updated in light of feedback. Previous experiments that studied whether framing 
operates through preferences or beliefs in prisoner’s dilemma (Ellingsen et al., 2012), public goods (Dufwenberg et al., 2011) 
and ultimatum games (Dreber et al., 2013) used one-shot games, thus it is unclear if the observed framing effects would 
disappear with repetition (similar concerns in social dilemma games were raised in Bernold et al., 2015).
We find that in contest and strategic complements, economic framing makes behavior more competitive, measured 
either by the average choice or by the frequency of competitive choices.8 The framing effect in substitutes is not significantly 
different from zero, but in contest and in complements the difference is significant and the effect size is larger than typically 
found in other games (12% in prisoner’s dilemmas, 6% in public goods games, 11% in trust games, and 10% in dictator games; 
see Gerlach and Jaeger, 2016). We find that differences between treatments are best explained by a hybrid model in which 
framing operates mostly through beliefs, and, to a lesser extent, also through preferences. The estimated parameter values 
suggest that abstract framing triggers slightly pro-social preferences and increased beliefs that others will act pro-socially, 
while economic framing shifts both preferences (slightly) and beliefs (substantially) in the competitive direction.
These results complement the existing literature on framing effects. It is generally found that abstract framing increases 
the degree of cooperation compared to economic framing; for instance, there is more cooperation in social dilemmas 
(Ellingsen et al., 2012; Engel and Rand, 2014; Batson and Moran, 1999; Pillutla and Chen, 1999), and higher transfers 
in ultimatum games (Hoffman et al., 1994). Our results extend these findings by showing that abstract framing moderates 
competitive behavior in the games of competition, but the framing effect decreases with repetition. We also find evidence 
2 For example, voluntary contribution experiments participants typically have an option to contribute to a ‘group exchange’ that benefits everyone else 
(Cookson, 2000), in trust games participants have an option to place bills in an envelope, which are multiplied and delivered to another participant (Berg 
et al., 1995).
3 See, for example, Ledyard (1995); Charness and Rabin (2002); Chaudhuri (2011); Murphy et al. (2011).
4 The idea that this difference could be caused by framing dates back at least to Andreoni (1995).
5 See, for example, Holt (1995); Bigoni and Fort (2013); Offerman et al. (2002). Similar patterns are observed in contest games (Sheremeta, 2013). Note 
that oligopoly experiments have found high levels of collusion in small fixed groups (Potters and Suetens, 2013) and after many repetitions (Friedman et 
al., 2015). Because we are interested not in collusive behavior but in the origins of competitive behavior, as found in experiments with large groups or 
random matching, we designed our games so as to limit factors known to promote collusion.
6 We define a choice as ‘cooperative’ if it would be chosen in equilibrium by a pair of pro-social players, i.e. those whose utility is increasing in the payoff 
of the other participant. A choice is defined as ‘competitive’ if it would be chosen by a pair of anti-social players, i.e. those whose utility is decreasing in 
the payoff of the other participant. For more details, see Appendix B.3.
7 Unless non-standard preferences are interactive and conditional (see Nax et al. 2015; Ackermann and Murphy 2019; Ackermann et al. 2016).
8 Economic framing increases the average choice across all rounds by 16% in contest, by 60% in strategic complements, and by 6% in strategic substitutes. 
All games are parametrized such that higher choices are more competitive.
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that framing operates primarily through beliefs, in line with the results in prisoner’s dilemma (Ellingsen et al., 2012), public 
goods (Dufwenberg et al., 2011) and ultimatum games (Dreber et al., 2013).
The games of strategic complements, substitutes and contests have been widely studied in the experimental literature,9
but almost exclusively with economic framing. Some experiments studied framing in contests (e.g. Chowdhury et al., 2020), 
but we are not aware of any studies that would have used abstract framing. Abstract framing has been used in the games 
of substitutes or complements, but it was not compared to other types of frames (Potters and Suetens, 2009, Abbink and 
Brandts, 2009, Ozkes and Hanaki, 2019).10 The only exception is a study by Huck et al. (2004) that compares economic 
framing to abstract framing in Cournot oligopoly. Huck et al. (2004) find more competitive choices under abstract framing 
compared with economic framing for duopolies, but no significant framing effect in larger markets. Our duopoly results do 
not reproduce a significant effect in strategic substitutes, but we confirm and extend their more general point that ‘frames 
interact with the objective structure of a game’.
2. Experimental design
One of the goals of this study is to identify whether framing operates primarily through preferences or through beliefs. 
We separate these two effects using three games of competition which exhibit different levels of strategic complementar-
ity/substitutability. Variability in the strategic nature of the game results in different predicted framing effects in each game, 
depending on the mechanism through which framing operates.
Before discussing the details of the experimental design, we will sketch the key identification strategy. First, we assume 
that economic framing either triggers more competitive preferences than abstract framing or anchors (initial) beliefs regard-
ing opponents’ actions/types at more competitive levels. Given this assumption, and given the three games of competition 
we formulate, we have the following differentiated predicted effects:
Strategic complements: more anti-social preferences and anti-social beliefs both increase the competitiveness of observed 
behavior.
Strategic substitutes: more anti-social preferences increase competitiveness, but more anti-social beliefs decrease it, result-
ing in a smaller framing effect than in strategic complements.
Contests: with elements of both substitutes and complements, the predicted framing effect lies between the other two 
games.
To ensure that the effects pertaining to the variation in the strategic nature of the underlying game are not confounded 
by other features of the games, we designed all three games to be as similar as possible in all other key aspects.11
2.1. Payoff functions
2.1.1. Proportional contest
A prize of value V is divided between two players, proportionally to the size of their investments, which we denote x1
and x2 . All investments are costly and have to be paid using an endowment E . The payoff of player i ∈ {1, 2} is therefore:
πi(xi, x j) =
xi
xi + x j
V + E − xi (1)
Standard rent-seeking (Tullock) contests are usually formulated with payoff risk, that is, the prize is not divided pro-
portionally to investments, but rather allocated to either party according to odds defined by the investments. To make the 
contest game more comparable with the games of strategic complements and substitutes, we replaced the probabilistic 
prize allocation rule by the proportional payment rule. With this change, contest is equivalent to a Cournot oligopoly with 
a unit elastic demand curve (as used, for example, in Friedman et al., 2015).12 The proportional contest is known to exhibit 
similar behavioral patterns as the probabilistic contest (see Masiliunas et al., 2014, Fallucchi et al., 2013, Chowdhury et al., 
2014).
2.1.2. Games of strategic complements and substitutes
The other two games used in this study are the games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements, which include 
Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly games with imperfect substitutes as special cases. We represent these games using a payoff 
9 For literature overview, see Dechenaux et al. (2015) and Sheremeta (2013) for contests, and Potters and Suetens (2013) and Engel (2007) for strategic 
complements and substitutes.
10 And, indeed, it has been debated whether higher collusion rates observed in some of these studies were caused by abstract framing (Anderson et al., 
2015).
11 This is important because varying game parameters has been shown to alter behavior given the same instantiations of preferences and beliefs (Murphy 
and Ackermann, 2015).
12 The payoff function in an n person Cournot game is πi(xi , x−i) = a + (P (X) − c)xi , and a unit elastic demand function is defined by P (X) = b∑n
k=1 xk
. 
The two are equivalent if b = V , a = E and c = 1.
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Fig. 1. Best-response curves under pure material self-interest.
Table 1
Comparison of the contest, strategic complements and substitutes games.
Contest Complements Substitutes
Nash action 250 250 250
Nash payoff 1250 1250 1250
Joint payoff max. action 0 0 0
Joint payoff max. payoff 1500 1500 1500
Relative payoff max. action 500 500 500
Relative payoff max. payoff 1000 1000 1000
Percent of dominated strategies 74.93% 74.83% 74.83%
Worst payoff possible 500 407 448
Best payoff possible 1950 1547 1578
Average payoff s.d. 159 195 170
Loss from random choice 184 176 156
Average ‘best-minus-worst response’ loss 488 638 533
function introduced by Potters and Suetens (2009). This formulation provides the necessary degrees of freedom to make the 
games comparable to each other and to the rent-seeking contest. The payoff function has six free parameters:




j + f xix j (2)
Crucially, the game is of strategic complements if ∂
2πi
∂xi∂x j
= f > 0, and of strategic substitutes if ∂
2πi
∂xi∂x j
= f < 0.
2.1.3. Comparability and parameter choices
We set the contest parameters to V = E = 1000 ECU.13 To make all three games comparable from a viewpoint of self-
interested payoff maximization, the parameters in the games of strategic complements and substitutes were chosen to en-
sure similar percentages of dominated strategies in all three games and identical locations (and payoffs) of the outcomes that 
correspond to (i) Nash equilibrium, (ii) joint profit maximization and (iii) relative profit maximization. These conditions 
are satisfied by the following parameter values: a = 1500, b = 0.5, c = −1.5, d = 21500 , e =
1
1500 , f =
1
1500 in the game of 
strategic complements and a = 1500, b = 0.5, c = −1.5, d = 22500 , e =
3
2500 , f = −
1
2500 in the game of strategic substitutes.
14
Fig. 1 compares the best-response curves, which are hump-shaped in the contest game, upward sloping in the game 
of strategic complements, and downward sloping in the game of strategic substitutes. Table 1 shows that all three games 
have a similar range and standard deviation of payoffs and an almost identical percentage of dominated strategies. In all 
games players face similar optimization incentives: a player would lose on average 160-180 ECU by choosing at random and 
490-640 ECU by making the worst possible choice, compared to the payoff of the best-response, if the opponent is assumed 
to choose uniformly.
Our method to identify the relative importance of preferences and beliefs relies on the comparison of behavior in games 
that differ primarily in terms of their strategic nature.15 If games differed in other important aspects, variation in treatment 
13 In the experiment, all earnings were expressed in Experimental Currency Units (ECU), converted into cash at the rate 100 ECU = 1 CHF.
14 A detailed derivation of these parameter values is in Appendix A.
15 The standard approach of eliciting beliefs or measuring social preferences in a separate task is problematic for several reasons. Preferences could be 
context-dependent, thus participants who act pro-socially in the post-experimental task (e.g. Murphy et al., 2011) might act anti-socially in the games of 
competition. For example, Herrmann and Orzen (2008) and Savikhin and Sheremeta (2013) find that the contest environment evokes anti-social behavior 
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effects could not be attributed to the strategic nature. For this reason, it was important to keep the location and payoff of 
each outcome of interest the same in all three games. Our approach follows Potters and Suetens (2009), but instead of keep-
ing the payoffs on the best-response curve constant across games, we control the location and payoff of the relative payoff 
maximization point.16 This feature is important because we seek to test whether economic framing induces competitive 
preferences or beliefs, thus we also need to know how competitiveness affects behavior. If the payoffs and the location of 
the relative payoff maximization point differed across games, it would be difficult to attribute differences in framing effects 
to the strategic nature of the game. Differences in payoffs would affect the costs of relative payoff maximization, thus the 
game in which spiteful actions are cheaper would be predicted to have a larger framing effect. Differences in the loca-
tions of competitive actions could change their salience and the probability that they will be chosen by mistake, potentially 
explaining differences in competitiveness and the extent to which competitiveness could be further affected by framing.
Identical locations of the outcomes of interest also ensure that the deviations from the Nash equilibrium towards more 
cooperative or competitive choices decrease payoffs by a similar amount in all games, and the decrease is sufficiently low to 
detect slight variations in preferences or beliefs. For example, a player with Nash equilibrium beliefs who deviates from the 
Nash equilibrium action of 250 by 50 and plays 200 would decrease own earnings by 2 ECU (6 ECU in contests), but would 
increase competitor’s earnings by about 50 ECU. Similarly, a deviation to 300 would decrease the competitor’s earnings by 
about 50 ECU, costing 2 ECU in the game of substitutes, 3 ECU in complements and 5 ECU in contest. Therefore, if framing 
manipulation has an effect on social preferences, a treatment difference should be observed in the final outcomes.
2.2. Other design details
We designed the other elements of the experiment to minimize the chances that deviations from the Nash equilibrium 
prediction occur because of reasons other than preferences or beliefs, and also to keep the design similar to the prior 
literature.
Action Space
In all three games the strategy space was {0, 1, . . . , 1000}. A fine strategy space reduces the chance that an outcome of 
interest will be observed by pure chance; instead, when an outcome is observed, it is likely to be a result of the properties 
of that outcome.
Instructions and timing
Payoffs were explained using a payoff table (reproduced in Appendix G) and a payoff calculator. The two tools com-
plement each other: a table gives a good overview of the payoff space, but only a limited number of payoff combinations 
can be displayed. A calculator allows payoffs to be calculated for any action profile.17 We recorded how much time each 
subject spent using the table and the calculator, as well as what action combinations were entered into the calculator. To 
ensure that experiments finished in time, we placed time restrictions on each round.18 If no decision was made within the 
time limit, the action from the previous round was implemented. If no decision was made in the first round, a randomly 
generated action was implemented. Throughout the paper, choices generated at random are excluded from the analysis (i.e. 
all choices until the first active decision).19
Repetition and matching
The game was repeated for 20 rounds. At the end of the experiment, two randomly drawn rounds were chosen for 
payment. After each round, participants were informed about their own and their opponent’s actions and payoffs. We used 
in games played subsequently or simultaneously. Direct belief elicitation could influence actions (Hoffmann, 2016) and the quality of elicited beliefs could 
be low (participants might not be motivated to report accurate beliefs, or reported beliefs could be chosen to justify their behavior to the experimenter; 
see Schlag et al., 2015, for a detailed discussion).
16 A change in payoffs on the best-response curve might affect the convergence speed of the best-response dynamics. We favor controlling the payoffs 
in the competitive outcome than payoffs on the best-response curve since we expect the effect of framing to depend more strongly on the incentives to 
act competitively than on the incentives to best-respond. In addition, it would not be possible to equalize the best-response payoffs across all three games 
(since the best-response curve is different in contests), while equalizing RPM payoffs is possible.
17 For a comparison between the two tools in Cournot oligopoly, see Requate and Waichman (2011).
18 The limit was 3.5 minutes in each of the first 5 rounds, 2.5 minutes for rounds 5-10, 1.5 minutes for rounds 11-15 and 1 minute for rounds 16-20. We 
chose this structure of time limits as a pilot study showed that most subjects would not be rushed by such restrictions.
19 By mistake, in some of the 2019 sessions the laboratory software was started while the participants were still reading the instructions. As a result, 
some participants did not notice that the experiment had already started and failed to make an active choice within the 3.5 minute time limit given in the 
first round. This issue affected a third of the participants (compared to less than 3% of participants who did not make an active choice in the first round 
of 2016 sessions). Only the choices in the first round were affected, as more than 99% of participants from 2019 sessions made an active choice in round 
2. Even though we excluded the non-active round 1 choices from the analysis, the remaining number of active choices varies across treatments, and the 
choices might be of low quality due to potentially being made under severe time pressure. Consequently, we measure the framing effect at the start of the 
game by comparing decisions in the first 5 rounds, instead of using only the first round data.
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two-player games because we expected a small group size to make it easier to understand the game, form beliefs and cal-
culate best-responses, lowering the chances that deviations from the Nash equilibrium will occur because of computational 
complexity rather than preferences or beliefs. The game is easy to understand because participants can see the payoff land-
scape using a simple two-dimensional table.20 Belief learning in two-player games is arguably less cognitively demanding 
because players do not need to form and update beliefs about several interaction partners. However, a small group size also 
makes it more likely that participants will collude (Huck et al., 2004) and it would be difficult to identify the framing ef-
fect on competitive behavior if the drive to collude crowded out other motives. We therefore made collusion more difficult 
by randomly re-matching participants each round. Prior studies generally find behavior to be closer to Nash equilibrium
predictions when random matching is used.21
Framing
We implemented two variations of each game, one with ‘abstract’ the other with ‘economic’ framing. Instructions for all 
treatments are reproduced in full in Appendix F. Abstract instructions were identical in all three games: players were asked 
to choose an ‘action, which is a number between 0 and 1000’ and the other party was referred to as the ‘other participant’. 
Behavior in abstract treatments should be driven primarily by the incentive structure, providing a baseline to evaluate 
behavior in treatments with non-abstract language. Instructions with economic framing followed typical language from 
previous laboratory experiments,22 to evaluate whether behavioral patterns in these games are triggered by such language. 
Framing of the games of strategic complements and substitutes followed Bigoni and Fort (2013), who asked participants to 
choose the ‘quantity produced’ and the other party was referred to as a ‘competitor’.23 The economic contest framing was 
based on Fallucchi et al. (2013) and Masiliunas et al. (2014): players were informed that they will receive a share of the 
‘prize’, depending on how many ‘contest tokens’ were bought by them and by the ‘other participant’.
Sessions
A treatment consists of a game (one out of three), and a frame (one out of two), forming six treatments. The first 
wave of experiments was run in May and October 2016 and second wave in November and December 2019. In each wave, 
24 participants took part in each of the six treatments, with a total of 48 participants per treatment (288 in total). All 
experiments were run at the Decision Science Laboratory of ETH Zurich. The average duration of the experiment was 1 
hour and average earnings were 32.2 Swiss francs (at the time of the experiment the exchange rate was about 1 CHF = 1 
USD). Experiments were programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 
2015).
3. Hypotheses
Full information about the payoff function was available in all treatments, therefore standard Nash equilibrium predic-
tions (assuming selfish preferences) are identical in all treatments.
Hypothesis H0. Choices are not significantly different between treatments with economic and abstract framing.
Alternative hypotheses are motivated by the psychology literature, which recognizes that behavior is sensitive to how the 
game is presented (e.g. see Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, Levin et al., 1998). In particular, we will explore the possibilities 
that either preferences or beliefs are context-dependent.
The first possibility is that preferences are context-dependent, and thus depend on framing (group identity theories). In 
contests, economic framing implies that the other participant represents an opposing team, potentially inducing spiteful 
preference. In fact, it has been found that contests induce group identity and participants subsequently act less pro-socially 
towards the members of the opposing team compared to the members of their own team (Zaunbrecher et al., 2017). In the 
20 In fact, we find that players on average spent much more time using a payoff table than a payoff calculator (43% compared to 20%).
21 Davis et al. (2003) find that the frequency of Nash equilibrium play in a Cournot triopoly is higher with random rather than with partner matching, 
although only when the marginal cost schedule is ‘steep’. Baik et al. (2015) find little difference between random and fixed matching in 2- and 3-player 
contests. Fallucchi and Renner (2016) find no effect of matching in contests when full information is provided, but random matching shifts choices closer 
to the Nash equilibrium when information about the choices and payoffs of other participants is suppressed.
22 In oligopoly games, subjects are often framed to act as ‘managers’, and market prices depend on their decisions as well as on those from ‘rivals’ or 
other ‘firms’ (Huck et al., 2000, Huck et al., 2001, Huck et al., 2004, Offerman et al., 2002), ‘sellers’ (Anderson et al., 2015) or ‘competitors’ (Gürerk and 
Selten, 2012, Bigoni and Fort, 2013). In typical contest framing, subjects compete with other ‘participants’ (Fallucchi et al., 2013, Masiliunas et al., 2014, 
Chowdhury et al., 2014, Sheremeta, 2010, Sheremeta, 2011)/‘opponents’ (Herrmann and Orzen, 2008, Lim et al., 2014) for a ‘prize’ (Herrmann and Orzen, 
2008, Lim et al., 2014, Fallucchi et al., 2013), ‘reward’ (Chowdhury et al., 2014, Sheremeta, 2010, Sheremeta, 2011) or for an additional monetary value 
(Masiliunas et al., 2014) by purchasing ‘lottery tickets’ (Faravelli and Stanca, 2012), ‘contest tokens’ (Fallucchi et al., 2013, Abbink et al., 2010) or by making 
‘bids’ (Chowdhury et al., 2014, Sheremeta, 2010, Sheremeta, 2011).
23 We used such quantity framing in both the games of strategic complements and substitutes, to keep the framing manipulation identical.
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Fig. 2. Nash equilibrium action with context-dependent preferences and beliefs.
games of complements and substitutes, economic framing might suggest that the other party is a member of an outgroup, 
and thus induce spiteful preference. There is some evidence that the context in which the other participant is embedded 
affects behavior; for example, both trust and trustworthiness are higher in a trust game when the other participant is 
referred to as a ‘partner’ instead of as an ‘opponent’ (Burnham et al., 2000).
Another possibility is that framing affects not the preferences, but beliefs about the type and therefore behavior of 
the opponent. This is especially plausible at the start of the game, before any feedback has been received. There is prior 
evidence suggesting that framing primarily affects beliefs rather than preferences (Ellingsen et al., 2012), but there is some 
disagreement regarding the direction of the effect (Dufwenberg et al., 2011), which we hope to clarify.
We model context-dependent preferences and beliefs using a simple utility function of the form ui(πi, π j) = πi + γiπ j , 
for i ∈ {1, 2}.24 Player i is altruistic if γi > 0 and spiteful if γi < 0. We assume that γi, γ j ∈ (−1, 1), that is players place 
a lower weight on opponent’s payoffs than on own payoffs. Our theoretical benchmark is the action of player i in a Nash 
equilibrium, x∗
i
(γi, γ j), derived in Appendix B.
We interpret γi as the social preference of player i, and γ j as the belief of player i about the social preference of j. First, 
we consider these mechanisms separately. To measure purely the effect of preferences, we calculate how x∗
i
(γi, γ j) depends 
on γi , when γ j is set to 0. To measure purely the effect of beliefs, we calculate how x∗i (γi, γ j) depends on γ j , when γi is 
set to 0.25
In Appendix B, we show that x∗
i
(γi, 0) is decreasing in γi , in all three games. This result is illustrated in panel (a) of 
Fig. 2. Compared to the benchmark of purely selfish preferences (γi = 0), spitefulness (γi < 0) induces more competitive 
(higher) and altruism (γi > 0) induces less competitive (lower) choices. According to the context-dependent preference 
hypothesis (Hp), economic framing shifts preferences towards spitefulness, predicting that in all three games choices will be 
more competitive than with abstract framing.
Hypothesis Hp. Choices are significantly less competitive with abstract framing than with economic framing in all three 
games.
Appendix B shows that the effect of beliefs depends on the nature of the game: x∗
i
(0, γ j) is decreasing in γ j in the 
game of strategic complements, increasing in strategic substitutes, and non-monotonic in the contest game. This result is 
illustrated in panel (b) of Fig. 2. The choices of players who expect more altruistic opponents (γ j > 0) are less competi-
tive than choices of players who expect more spiteful (γ j < 0) opponents in the game of strategic complements, but the 
pattern is reversed in the game of strategic substitutes. In contests, players who expect more altruistic or more spiteful op-
ponents behave less competitively than players expecting self-regarding opponents (γ j = 0). The context-dependent belief 
hypothesis (Hb) states that economic framing will lead players to expect more spiteful opponents, predicting more com-
petitive choices in the game of strategic complements and less competitive choices in strategic substitutes. The relationship 
is non-monotonic and smaller in contests. Note that the context-dependent belief hypothesis rests on the assumption that 
beliefs and preferences are independent; Appendix C shows that it will no longer hold if the interaction between beliefs 
and preferences is sufficiently high.
24 This corresponds, for example, to how social preferences are instantiated in the Social Value Orientation (SVO) measure (Murphy and Ackermann, 
2014). An alternative assumption would be to allow preference to be interactive (see Nax et al. 2015; Ackermann and Murphy 2019; Ackermann et al. 
2016). Appendix C illustrates the predictions of a model with interactive preferences, based on a utility function proposed by Levine (1998). We show that 
when the interaction between beliefs and preferences is sufficiently high, some of the predictions developed in this section would no longer hold (e.g. the 
context-dependent belief hypothesis would no longer distinguish strategic complements from substitutes). However, we favor the non-interactive version 
of preferences and beliefs presented in this section because it has a clear interpretation and distinction between preferences and beliefs.
25 Of course, framing might operate through both beliefs and preferences at the same time; we will consider such a hybrid model in section 4.4.
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Table 2
Average choices across treatments. Standard deviations (in parentheses) are calculated for each matching group and round, and then 
averaged. MWU is a two-sided Mann-Whitney U test.
Rounds Independent 
observations1-20 1-5 15-20
Contest Economic 249 (76) 221 (124) 264 (47) 12
Abstract 214 (73) 169 (129) 245 (49) 12
MWU p-value 0.0377 0.0350 0.3263
Complements Economic 322 (103) 361 (178) 311 (72) 12
Abstract 201 (88) 195 (154) 213 (52) 12
MWU p-value 0.0015 0.0001 0.0243
Substitutes Economic 251 (128) 243 (190) 269 (104) 12
Abstract 238 (133) 245 (180) 242 (110) 12
MWU p-value 1.0 0.9081 0.6033
Fig. 3. Average action over time.
Hypothesis Hb. Choices are significantly less competitive with abstract framing in the game of strategic complements, but 
more competitive in the game of strategic substitutes.
4. Results
4.1. Aggregate results
We find that economic framing induces more competitive behavior, increasing the average choice from 214 to 249 
(16%) in contest, from 201 to 322 (60%) in strategic complements and from 238 to 251 (6%) in strategic substitutes. We 
evaluate the significance of the framing effect by calculating the average action in each matching group (12 matching 
groups per treatment) and comparing the values using the Mann-Whitney U-test. Table 2 shows that across all rounds, the 
framing effect is significant in contest (p = 0.0377) and strategic complements (p = 0.0015), but not in strategic substitutes 
(p = 1.0). Both the economic size of the effect and the statistical significance in contest and strategic complements are 
lower at the end of the game (last 5 rounds) than at the start (first 5 rounds). Further evidence for the diminishing framing 
effect can be seen by plotting the average choice in each treatment over time (Fig. 3).
We quantify the framing effect and its change over time by regressing the individual choices on a dummy variable in-
dicating the framing condition, round number and their interaction. Table 3 shows the estimated coefficient values. The 
framing effect is significant in contests and complements, but not in substitutes. On average, economic framing increases 
first round choices by 56 points in contest and by 165 points in complements. In complements, the treatment difference 
decreases by 5 points per round. By the end of the experiment, the estimated treatment effect is significant only in comple-
ments. The average framing effect in all rounds is significant in contest (35 points difference) and in strategic complements 
(121 points difference), but not significantly different in strategic substitutes.
None of the three hypotheses listed in the previous section can fully explain the data. The Nash equilibrium hypothesis 
(H0) can be rejected because the framing effect is clearly observed in the contest game and in the game of strategic 
complements. The context-dependent preference hypothesis (Hp) correctly predicts the treatment effect in contest games 
and in strategic complements, but fails to explain why such pattern is not observed in strategic substitutes. The context-
dependent belief hypothesis (Hb) correctly predicts the ranking of the framing effect across the three games, but the effect 
in strategic substitutes is insignificant instead of being the opposite of strategic complements. These findings suggest that 
a combination of context-dependent preferences and beliefs is needed to organize the results, as will be discussed in 
section 4.4.
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Table 3
Random-effects regression (GLS). Standard errors are clustered on the matching group level (24 clusters per game).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All games Contest Complements Substitutes
Economic framing (round 1) 70.794*** 55.939*** 164.722*** -4.883
(3.66) (2.75) (5.59) (-0.15)
Round 1.895** 4.988*** 1.253 -0.372
(2.11) (4.56) (0.88) (-0.22)
Round * Economic framing -1.509 -2.089 -4.596** 1.897
(-1.22) (-1.62) (-2.09) (0.90)
Economic framing (round 20) 42.127** 16.257 77.403* 31.157
(2.13) (0.79) (1.77) (0.92)
Economic framing (rounds 1-20) 56.285*** 34.907** 120.650*** 13.322
(3.60) (2.13) (3.91) (0.51)
Number of observations 5708 1897 1905 1906
t statistics in parentheses.
Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Fig. 4. Kernel density estimation using Epanechnikov kernel function.
4.2. Classification of individual and matching group behavior
We have shown that framing has a significant effect on the average action in strategic complements and contest. This 
section studies how framing affects matching group and individual behavior.
Fig. 4 shows the kernel density estimations of individual choices in each treatment.26 We classify individual choices 
into three categories (JPM, NE or RPM), based on which of the three outcomes (joint profit maximization point, Nash 
equilibrium, relative profit maximization point) is closest to the chosen action (a similar classification procedure is used by 
Huck et al., 2004). The framing effect is strongest in strategic complements, where abstract framing reduces the fraction of 
RPM choices from 29% to 8% and increases the fraction of JPM choices from 7% to 24% (NE rates remain similar at 64% and 
68% respectively). A similar but smaller effect is found in contest, where abstract framing reduces RPM choices from 11% to 
6%, but increases JPM rates from 11% to 19% (NE rates are 78% and 75%). Distributions are similar in strategic substitutes, 
with slightly higher JPM rates (29% vs 20%) and lower NE rates (58% vs 67%) in abstract treatments (RPM rates are 13% in 
both).
Classification of individual choices by partitioning the strategy space ignores the data structure. As an alternative, we 
classify each matching group based on the outcomes most group members chose on most rounds. For example, if a group 
converges to the Nash equilibrium or is colluding, we would expect most group members to act in line with this prediction. 
Since there are three main outcomes of interest (collusive outcome is at 0, Nash equilibrium is at 250 and the competitive 
outcome is at 500), we classify a round as a ‘fully collusive round’ for matching groups in which most group members (i.e. 
at least 3 out of 4) choose an action in the 0-50 range, as ‘NE round’ for groups in which most members choose in the 
225-275 range and as ‘fully competitive’ if the actions are in the 475-525 range. If the action profile does not meet any 
of these criteria, we classify the round as ‘partly collusive’ if the choices of most group members are more collusive than 
the equilibrium prediction (i.e. below 250) and as ‘partly competitive’ if the majority of choices are more competitive than 
the equilibrium (i.e. above 250). Otherwise, we leave that round unclassified. We then count the number of rounds a group 
has been placed into each category, and call the group ‘fully collusive’ / ‘partly collusive’ / ‘NE’ / ‘partly competitive’ / ‘fully 
26 The evolution of choices by each participant is shown in figures E.4 – E.3 in Appendix E.
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Fig. 5. Classification of matching groups. No groups are classified as fully competitive.
competitive’ based on the category to which the group has been assigned in most the rounds (no ties occurred, therefore 
each group was assigned into one category).
Fig. 5 shows how matching groups were classified in each treatment. No group is classified as fully competitive and only 
three groups are fully collusive (two in strategic complements and one in substitutes; see figure E.1 in Appendix E for more 
details). All three colluding groups are found in the abstract framing conditions.27 In contest and strategic complements, 
economic framing increases the number of partly competitive groups and decreases the number of NE, fully and partly 
collusive groups. The large treatment effect in strategic complements is driven in part by higher collusion rates (2 groups 
fully colluded in abstract framing treatment, none in economic), but mainly by a large difference in partly competitive 
behavior (2 groups in abstract framing treatment and 8 in economic). In strategic substitutes, most groups are classified as 
partly competitive and there is little difference between treatments.
4.3. Adaptation and outcomes in the long run
So far we looked only at the effect of framing on aggregate outcomes. Next, we will compare differences in terms of the 
patterns of adaptation and the long-run outcomes, to test if abstract framing increases the tendency to best-respond and 
the likelihood of convergence to the Nash equilibrium. In terms of the adaptation process, we compare two rules that could 
be used our setting: best-responding to the action chosen by the opponent the previous round and imitating the action of 
the most successful person in the group. Since we study only two-player games, imitate-the-best predicts either choosing 
the opponent’s action (if opponent’s payoff was higher than own payoff) or choosing the same action as in the previous 

















is i’s best reply to the opponent’s action in round t − 1 and ibt−1
i
is the action of the person in the pair who 
obtained higher payoffs in t − 1. The β coefficients measure the importance of each adaptation rule: βr = 1 and βib = 0
would indicate perfect adjustment to the myopic best-response; βr = 0 and βib = 1 would indicate perfect imitation.
The first three models in Table 4 show the estimated coefficient values in each game when both framing conditions are 
pooled. The last column pools all three games. The coefficients of both best-response and imitation are significantly above 
zero in all three games. The best-response coefficient is higher than the coefficient of imitation, which might suggest that 
best-response is more important than imitation, although Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis that βr −βib is significantly 
different from zero (p = 0.1055 in contest, p > 0.4 in the other two games, p = 0.1092 when pooled). The importance of 
imitation also seems to decrease in abstract treatments, although the difference is not statistically significant (the coefficient 
for interaction between βib and abstract framing is not significant in all four models). These conclusions do not change if 
we additionally control for the game in the pooled model. Table E.1 in Appendix E shows the parameter values estimated 
separately for each treatment. The results are very similar and there is no significant difference between the coefficients 
of best-response and imitation (except for the abstract contest, in which Wald test p = 0.0086). Overall, even though best-
response has a consistently higher coefficient than imitation and there is some indication that the importance of imitation 
decreases when abstract framing is used, none of these differences are statistically significant. We therefore conclude that 
both myopic best-response and imitation can explain some patterns of adaptation, but there is no difference between the 
two and no significant framing effect on the importance of either adaptation rule.
Finally, we test whether framing affects long-run behavior, and specifically the rates of convergence to the Nash equi-
librium. If economic framing permanently activates competitive preferences, participants might fail to adapt their choices 
27 Since the games were not designed to study collusion, collusion rates were very low (only 3 out of 72 groups) and we cannot conclude whether 
colluding is more difficult with economic framing.
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Table 4
Random effects GLS regression. Independent variable is the change in chosen action across rounds. Standard errors are 
clustered on the matching group level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contest Complements Substitutes All games
βr 0.355*** 0.308*** 0.357*** 0.335***
(7.76) (5.85) (5.58) (9.65)
βib 0.202*** 0.241*** 0.275*** 0.241***
(3.40) (4.60) (4.14) (6.27)
Abstract -11.29* -18.49** -2.639 -11.29**
(-1.78) (-1.99) (-0.24) (-1.97)
Abstract * βr 0.172* 0.0550 -0.115 -0.0147
(1.84) (0.53) (-1.39) (-0.25)
Abstract * βib -0.0907 -0.113 -0.0485 -0.0528
(-0.82) (-1.24) (-0.53) (-0.91)
Constant -0.821 -2.394 -20.90*** -7.329**
(-0.24) (-0.43) (-3.16) (-2.12)
Observations 1801 1809 1810 5420
t statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 5
Fraction of choices in the neighborhood of NE in rounds 11-20. The neighborhood is measured as a percentage of 
the range between JPM and RPM choices.
5% neighborhood 10% neighborhood
Economic Abstract Economic Abstract
Contest 42% 50% 69% 71%
Strategic complements 21% 44% 56% 69%
Strategic substitutes 18% 16% 57% 51%
in the direction of the best-response and convergence rates would be lower. If framing effects are transitory and subject 
to updating in light of evidence, they should not prevent convergence to Nash equilibrium. We measure convergence by 
calculating the fraction of observations in the second half of the experiment that are in the neighborhood of the Nash 
equilibrium, defined in terms of the percentage of the range between the joint payoff maximization and relative payoff 
maximization points (see Davis, 2011, for a similar approach). Table 5 shows that economic framing lowers the conver-
gence rates in contest and in strategic complements, but not in strategic substitutes. We evaluate the statistical significance 
of treatment differences by comparing the relative frequency of choices in the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium for 
each matching group. We find a significant difference only in strategic complements when 5% neighborhood is used (MWU 
p = 0.0458). Figure E.1 (Appendix E) illustrates this difference in strategic complements by plotting the dynamics of average 
choice in each matching group.
4.4. Static model of beliefs and preferences
Our next goal is to uncover what framing differences across games reveal about the origins of the framing effect. First, 
we develop a static model in which both beliefs and preferences are context-dependent, and estimate the combinations 
of preferences and beliefs that can best explain our experimental data. As in section 3, we assume the following utility 
function28:
ui(πi,π j) = πi + γiπ j , for i ∈ {1,2} (3)
We are interested in finding the combination of context-dependent social preferences (γi ) and beliefs about opponent’s 
social preference (γ j) that can best explain the experimental data. Our solution concept is the Nash equilibrium action, 
derived from equation (3) (see equations (15) and (14) in Appendix B). Fig. 6 illustrates the equilibrium action for a range of 
parameter values. With standard preferences (γi = γ j = 0), Nash equilibrium is equal to 250 in all three games. A movement 
along the 45 degree line towards the upper right corner is the usual way to model pro-social preferences, with identical 
preferences for both players (γi = γ j > 0). In all three games, pro-social preferences decrease the equilibrium action of 
player i (i.e. behavior becomes more cooperative). Similarly, a movement towards the lower left corner is the usual way to 
model anti-social preferences (γi = γ j < 0), which increases the equilibrium action of player i (i.e. behavior becomes more 
28 Allowing the preferences and beliefs to be interactive (using the utility function from Levine, 1998) would not improve the explanatory power of 
the model because any utility specification with interactive preferences can be equivalently represented using the utility function specified in (3), with 
appropriately chosen weights. For more details and examples, see Appendix C.1.
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Fig. 6. Nash equilibrium quantity as a function of possible combinations of weight attached by self to other player (γi ) and weight attached by other player 
to self (γ j ). The arrows indicate the estimated change in beliefs and preferences caused by economic framing.
competitive). Movement along the vertical or horizontal lines decomposes the effect into a part that is due to beliefs and a 
part that is due to preferences. Ceteris paribus, a preference change (horizontal movement) has a similar effect as a change 
in both preferences and beliefs. Effects due to changes in beliefs differ across the three games. In complements, players who 
expect the other participant to place a positive weight on their own payoff (γi = 0, γ j > 0) would lower their actions, and 
those expecting a negative weight (γi = 0, γ j < 0) would increase them. In substitutes, the effect is reversed. In contests, 
any change in beliefs would decrease chosen actions.
Next, we look for the combination (γi , γ j) that best fits the data. We allow parameters to be context-dependent, but 
assume no heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs across the population, and no differences between the populations in 









treatments with economic framing, by minimizing the mean squared deviation (MSD) between the Nash equilibrium pre-
diction and experimental data. The estimated parameter values indicate anti-social preferences and beliefs with economic 
framing (γ̂ ei = −0.08, γ̂
e
j = −0.74) and pro-social preferences and beliefs with abstract framing (γ̂
a
i = 0.08, γ̂
a
j = 0.17). In 
Fig. 6, this change from abstract to economic framing is indicated by an arrow. Note that with both abstract and economic 
framing the estimated effect is much stronger on beliefs than on preferences. When we allow for either only context-
dependent beliefs or only context-dependent preferences, the fit of either model is worse than the hybrid model. The 
estimated root mean squared deviation equals 140.2 in the hybrid model, 144.1 with only context-dependent beliefs and 
143.4 with only context-dependent preferences. These results show that the framing effect observed in our data can be 
explained by a model in which framing operates mostly through beliefs, but also, to a smaller extent, through prefer-
ences.
4.5. Dynamic model of beliefs and preferences
Section 4.4 showed that a static model with context-dependent preferences and beliefs can explain the treatment dif-
ferences in terms of average choices. This section tests whether a dynamic model of context-dependent preferences or 
beliefs can explain the adaptation behavior. A dynamic setup allows us to implement a game-theoretic view that beliefs are 
updated based on the observed history, but preferences are time-invariant.
We model beliefs and preferences in a dynamic setting using a belief learning model: observed history is used to form 
beliefs about opponent’s future behavior and players choose a (noisy) best-response to their beliefs. The starting point of our 
model is weighted fictitious play (Cheung and Friedman, 1997). In the original model, probabilistic beliefs about each action 
are determined by counting their empirical frequencies. We modify it by allowing point beliefs, calculated as a weighted 
average of observed past choices (see Offerman et al., 2002, for a similar approach). This approach is necessary because of 
the large strategy space, with which the empirical counts of each action grow too slowly. The second modification adds 
context-dependent social preferences and beliefs. Beliefs are modeled through the initial beliefs held in the first round. 
Social preferences are modeled by assuming that players maximize not the expected payoff, but the expected utility, which 
includes a term for opponent’s payoff. Modeled this way, the importance of initial beliefs diminishes over time, while the 
effect of preferences remains constant in all rounds.
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Table 6
Estimated parameter values of a belief learning model with context-dependent preferences and beliefs. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Parameter Contest Complements Substitutes
Economic Abstract Economic Abstract Economic Abstract
λ (sensitivity) 0.033 0.033 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.001)
γ (discount factor) 0.57 0.57 0.28 0.28 1 1
(0.066) (0.066) (0.10) (0.10) (-) (-)
W (weight of initial belief) 62.35 62.35 3.57 3.57 714.29 714.29
(42.87) (42.87) (2.81) (2.81) (4278.60) (4278.60)
b(1) (initial belief) 623.47 741.34 999.71 306.62 1000 84.23
(31.51) (41.52) (117.08) (90.22) (-) (113.76)
α (other-regarding preference) 0.0044 0.11 -0.087 0.24 -0.16 0.26
(0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.02) (0.02) (0.055)
Fig. 7. Choice paths simulated with the parameter values from Table 6.
where h−i(t) is the choice of the other participant in round t , γ is the discount factor,29 bi(1) ∈ [0, 1000] is the initial belief 
in the first round, and W  1 is the weight of the initial belief.
The expected utility of action a ∈ A ≡ [0, 1000] for player i in round t depends on own payoff and on opponent’s payoff:
Eui(a,bi(t)) = πi(a,bi(t)) + απ j(bi(t),a)
with payoff functions defined by equations (1) and (2).
The probability to choose action a is calculated using a logistic choice rule, in which parameter λ measures the sensitivity 







, with λ ∈ [0,∞) (5)
For each player and each round, we calculate beliefs using equation (4) and the predicted likelihood of the chosen action 
using equation (5). We round actions to the closest multiple of 5, to reduce the computational complexity. The parameter 
values of the five free parameters are estimated using log-likelihood maximization, separately for each game and allowing 
for framing-specific initial beliefs and preferences (as measured by parameters b(1) and α). Estimations were performed 
using derivative-free optimization routines with various starting values. Standard errors were calculated from the variance-
covariance matrix, estimated from the numerical approximation of the Hessian matrix. Standard errors for parameters at 
the bound are not provided.
Estimated parameter values are displayed in Table 6. In each game, the estimated initial beliefs b(1) are more competitive 
(higher) with economic compared to abstract framing. Similarly, the estimated preference parameter α is more competitive 
(lower) with economic compared to abstract framing. Note that in this model almost all the estimated preference parameters 
are pro-social, in contrast to the anti-social preferences under economic framing estimated in section 4.4. The difference is 
driven by imperfect sensitivity to expected utility differences added to this model, which biases choices upwards even in 
the absence of spite.
29 If γ = 0, the belief is equal to the action of the other participant in the previous round and the model reduces to Cournot best-response. If γ = 1, the 
belief is equal to the average action of the other participant in all past rounds.
30 Mäs and Nax (2016) have investigated behavioral deviation rates as implied by such a model.
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Finally, the estimated parameter values are used to simulate the path of choices in each treatment, testing whether 
belief learning with context-dependent beliefs and preferences can reproduce the empirical choice patterns. The simulated 
agents are randomly paired within a 4-agent matching group, just as in the experiment. We simulate the path of choices 
for 1000 agents, and display the average choices in Fig. 7. Overall, the simulations closely reproduce the dynamics observed 
in experiments (compare to Fig. 3).
5. Concluding remarks
We find that economic framing as used in typical contest and oligopoly experiments leads to more competitive behavior 
in contests and in the game of strategic complements. In strategic substitutes, the framing effect is smaller and not signifi-
cant. The difference between games can be explained with beliefs being more strongly affected by framing than preferences. 
The finding that the framing effect is increasing in the degree of strategic complementarity can help resolve some puzzles 
from prior experiments. For example, Huck et al. (2004) find that economic framing has no effect or even reduces the com-
petitiveness of choices in Cournot oligopoly, in contrast to the opposite finding in social dilemma games (Pillutla and Chen, 
1999, Engel and Rand, 2014). This difference could be explained by the strategic environment, as Cournot oligopoly is a 
game of strategic substitutes, while social dilemma games exhibit strategic complementarity (Fischbacher et al., 2001). Our 
results also complement previous findings about framing in Cournot oligopoly (i.e. strategic substitutes) from Huck et al. 
(2004), who find that economic framing increases cooperation in duopolies but there is no framing effect in markets with 
five firms. In our game of strategic substitutes, there is no framing effect despite the use of two-player groups, which may 
suggest that framing effects in Cournot are relatively weak or design-dependent.31
Our study’s main focus is on the causes and consequences of the framing effect, therefore we did not discuss the main 
effect of the strategic complementarity. But since the games were designed to be comparable, we can contribute to the 
literature by testing whether strategic complements are different from substitutes under either framing condition. Previous 
literature found that strategic complementarity increases collusion both with standard framing (for an overview, see Suetens 
and Potters, 2007, or Engel, 2007) and with abstract framing (Potters and Suetens, 2009), although the two effects cannot 
be compared because of variation in design details across studies. We find more cooperation in strategic substitutes than 
in complements when economic framing is used, but no significant difference under abstract framing (for more details, 
see Appendix D). The difference could be attributed to the effect the strategic environment has on beliefs and preferences: 
competitive preferences and beliefs, activated by economic framing, reinforce each other in strategic complements, but offset 
each other in substitutes.
Why does strategic complementarity decrease cooperation in our experiment, in contrast to the results in the previous 
literature (as reviewed in Suetens and Potters, 2007)? The discrepancy is most likely due to variance in design details. First, 
the previous literature used different framing for Cournot (described as quantity competition) and Bertrand games (price 
competition), while we used the same framing in both strategic complements and substitutes. Second, there are differences 
in terms of payoff functions, as we followed Potters and Suetens (2009) instead of the standard Cournot and Bertrand payoff 
function. Third, we used random rather than fixed matching. If fixed matching is used, some participants might attempt 
to collude and the presence of strategic complementarity creates incentives for other participants to adjust choices in the 
same direction, boosting the frequency of partly collusive behavior (see Potters and Suetens, 2009, for a discussion of this 
hypothesis). Re-matching makes collusion difficult and instead might increase partly competitive choices, especially under 
economic framing. In this environment, strategic complementarity would operate in the opposite direction, boosting the 
frequency of partly competitive choices. In future research, it would be interesting to test this hypothesis by comparing the 
effect of the strategic environment across the two matching protocols.
Our approach of separating preferences and beliefs required some simplifying assumptions, which come with several 
caveats. First, we assumed that preferences are stable (i.e. not interactive or conditional) over the course of the experiment. 
To address this issue, we calculate the predictions for interactive preferences (Levine, 1998) and show that our results 
still hold as long as the interaction is sufficiently low. Second, our static framework follows the conventional assumption 
that beliefs are always correct. In fact, there is evidence that beliefs are often incorrect or misspecified, and the extent 
of departures from rational expectations may even depend on the strategic nature of the game (Fehr and Tyran, 2008), 
which might bias our explanations. Third, beliefs, consistent or not, may be self-confirming which creates a chicken-and-
egg problem vis-a-vis our explanation (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993). Some of these issues could be addressed in future 
research by explicitly eliciting and studying the beliefs. Future research would ideally also investigate other types of frames 
(e.g. cooperative framing commonly used in social dilemma games) and how frames interact with the nature of the game. 
It would also be very useful to independently measure preferences and study which participants are more susceptible to 
the framing effects, especially given the recent evidence about the interaction between types and the strategic environment 
(Savikhin and Sheremeta, 2013; Prediger et al., 2014; Cárdenas et al., 2015).
In sum, our study indicates that framing choices need to be made carefully, because the impact of framing is not uniform 
and may depend on the nature of the game. We show that a difference between the games of strategic complements and 
31 Due to different research goals, we made different design choices than Huck et al. (2004): for example, we did not use the standard Cournot payoff 
function; we used random matching instead of partner matching; our instructions used different language than the corresponding treatments in Huck et 
al. (2004).
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A. Masiliūnas and H.H. Nax Games and Economic Behavior 124 (2020) 604–619
substitutes, found under economic framing, disappears when abstract framing is used. Since these effects are stronger at 
the start of the game, framing should be of particular importance in short or one-shot experiments. Which type of framing 
should be used, therefore, depends on the research questions. Economic framing might be more suitable to study specific 
hypotheses about firm behavior in oligopolies. Abstract framing might be more suitable to evaluate the effect of game-
theoretic features. The comparison of both conditions reveals whether the observed behavioral regularities are driven by the 
economic incentives, or instead by other social or moral factors that are activated by the provided context. Future studies 
may proceed in this way to identify what kinds of ‘non-economic interventions’ (i.e. as driven by non-abstract framing such 
as information design and nudging) might be useful for firms to complement or substitute standard economic interventions 
aimed at modifying the strategic incentives of the game via mechanism or market design.
Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at https://doi .org /10 .1016 /j .geb .2020 .10 .002.
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A. Masiliūnas and H.H. Nax Games and Economic Behavior 124 (2020) 604–619
Holt, C.A., 1995. Industrial organization: a survey of laboratory research. In: The Handbook of Experimental Economics, pp. 349–444.
Huck, S., Normann, H.-T., Oechssler, J., 1999. Learning in Cournot oligopoly–an experiment. Econ. J. 109 (454), 80–95.
Huck, S., Normann, H.-T., Oechssler, J., 2000. Does information about competitors’ actions increase or decrease competition in experimental oligopoly mar-
kets? Int. J. Ind. Organ. 18 (1), 39–57.
Huck, S., Muller, W., Normann, H.-T., 2001. Stackelberg beats Cournot—on collusion and efficiency in experimental markets. Econ. J. 111 (474), 749–765.
Huck, S., Normann, H.-T., Oechssler, J., 2004. Two are few and four are many: number effects in experimental oligopolies. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 53 (4), 
435–446.
Ledyard, J.O., 1995. Public goods: a survey of experimental research. In: Kagel, J., Roth, A. (Eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, pp. 111–194, chapter 2.
Levin, I.P., Schneider, S.L., Gaeth, G.J., 1998. All frames are not created equal: a typology and critical analysis of framing effects. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. 
Process. 76 (2), 149–188.
Levine, D.K., 1998. Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments. Rev. Econ. Dyn. 1 (3), 593–622.
Liberman, V., Samuels, S.M., Ross, L., 2004. The name of the game: predictive power of reputations versus situational labels in determining prisoner’s 
dilemma game moves. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 30 (9), 1175–1185.
Lim, W., Matros, A., Turocy, T.L., 2014. Bounded rationality and group size in Tullock contests: experimental evidence. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 99, 155–167.
Mäs, M., Nax, H.H., 2016. A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games. J. Econ. Theory 162, 195–208.
Masiliunas, A., Mengel, F., Reiss, J.P., 2014. Behavioral variation in Tullock contests. Technical report, Working Paper Series in Economics, Karlsruher. Institut 
für Technologie (KIT).
Murphy, R.O., Ackermann, K.A., 2014. Social value orientation: theoretical and measurement issues in the study of social preferences. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 
Rev. 18 (1), 13–41.
Murphy, R.O., Ackermann, K.A., 2015. Social preferences, positive expectations, and trust based cooperation. J. Math. Psychol. 67, 45–50.
Murphy, R.O., Ackermann, K.A., Handgraaf, M.J., 2011. Measuring social value orientation. Judgm. Decis. Mak. 6 (8), 771–781.
Nax, H.H., Murphy, R.O., Ackermann, K.A., 2015. Interactive preferences. Econ. Lett. 135 (C), 133–136.
Offerman, T., Potters, J., Sonnemans, J., 2002. Imitation and belief learning in an oligopoly experiment. Rev. Econ. Stud. 69 (4), 973–997.
Ozkes, A., Hanaki, N., 2019. Talkin’bout cooperation. Working paper, available at SSRN: https://ssrn .com /abstract =3484927.
Pillutla, M.M., Chen, X.-P., 1999. Social norms and cooperation in social dilemmas: the effects of context and feedback. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 78 
(2), 81–103.
Potters, J., Suetens, S., 2009. Cooperation in experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes. Rev. Econ. Stud. 76 (3), 1125–1147.
Potters, J., Suetens, S., 2013. Oligopoly experiments in the current millennium. J. Econ. Surv. 27 (3), 439–460.
Prediger, S., Vollan, B., Herrmann, B., 2014. Resource scarcity and antisocial behavior. J. Public Econ. 119, 1–9.
Requate, T., Waichman, I., 2011. “A profit table or a profit calculator?” A note on the design of Cournot oligopoly experiments. Exp. Econ. 14 (1), 36–46.
Savikhin, A.C., Sheremeta, R.M., 2013. Simultaneous decision-making in competitive and cooperative environments. Econ. Inq. 51 (2), 1311–1323.
Schlag, K.H., Tremewan, J., Van der Weele, J.J., 2015. A penny for your thoughts: a survey of methods for eliciting beliefs. Exp. Econ. 18 (3), 457–490.
Sheremeta, R.M., 2010. Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests. Games Econ. Behav. 68 (2), 731–747.
Sheremeta, R.M., 2011. Contest design: an experimental investigation. Econ. Inq. 49 (2), 573–590.
Sheremeta, R.M., 2013. Overbidding and heterogeneous behavior in contest experiments. J. Econ. Surv. 27 (3), 491–514.
Smith, V.L., 1976. Experimental economics: induced value theory. Am. Econ. Rev. 66 (2), 274–279.
Suetens, S., Potters, J., 2007. Bertrand colludes more than Cournot. Exp. Econ. 10 (1), 71–77.
Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., 1981. The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science 211 (4481), 453–458.
Zaunbrecher, H.W., Williams, T., Riedl, A., 2017. Social identity in the lab: a horse race between methods. Mimeo, Maastricht University.
619
